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Skreoq?ic beliefs are ?mong the most striking examples of th€ signGcance that the social €nvironment has for the content of ou cognitions. From last ceDtury's Uncb Ton's Cakn @ roday's teenag€ w€lfare mother on the nighdy news, Ame cm culture ha alwals been m abundmt source of images about vdious social groups. The importance of such images for the content of individual stereog?ic beliefs has be€n recognized since the earlywritings on srereoq?hg and prcjudice GeeAllporr, 1954; Katz & BEly, 1933; Kelrnm, 1958; Lippmmn, 1922 ) .
Yet, although there seems to be litde doubt of the significance of social influen€es on the content of a person's stereotypic betiels, litd€ psychological research actua[y addresses .his issue. Gr€enberg alld Pyszczynski (1985, p. 6I) , for exDple, asseri dlat "there is an aldming deuth of expe mental rcsedch" on the effects of social inf'lu€nce for prejudice and srereoq?ing. Moreover, the €xisting work that does address the relelance ofsocial int'luence to prejudiced attitudes and beliefs has t-radilionally locu.ed on a.pe(ts ot aflirude expression rather than on the formation or conv€rsion ofattitudes. That is, a number of studies have documenied tha. rormative social pressure is conducive to dle expression of less prejudiced attitudes or less srereoqpic target e\.aluations (e.g., Blanchard, Lily, & Vaughn, 1991; Gaetner & Dovidio, 19??; Mcconahay, 1986; Sigall & "The subdest and most permive ofall influences are tlose which create and maintain the repertory ofstereotypes. we are told about the worid before we see ir."
Walter Lippmann (1922,pp.89-90) This statem€nt by walter Lippmann is reminiscent of one ofthe bffic principles underlyirg social psychologicrl anallsis: ou subjective conshuction of rearity is shaped by the beliefs, thoughts, md actions of the people around us (Asch, 1952; Eagly & ChaikcD, 1993; Festingea 1S54; Mdkus & Zajonc, 1985; Mead, 1934; Moscovici, 1985; Schachter & Singer, 1962) . The way other peopl€ se€ the world often serves as a crucial ftame of reference for our oun undeNtanding of a complex Dd mbiguous reality. Page, 1971 ; for a review see Crosby, Bromley, & Sa!e, 1980) . In this article, we inrend to focus insread on rhe informational value that other people's beliefs have for t}re conbnt of a persoi's stereotypes. That is, rarher rhalr being interested in how exisiing social norms may coerce p€ople into the expression of a given belief, we want to examine how these norms may acrua[y serve as a ralidating bxis for th€ir own construal of :he social €nvllonmelt.
The first empirical evidence, though rather indirect, that cultually dominart betiefs de relevanr for the content of peopl€'s stereott?es comes from the classic work by Katz and Braly (1933) . This study, as wcll as rhe replications canied out since (Dovidio & Caeturcr, 1986; Gilbert, 195r; Karlins, Coffnar, & Watters, 1969) , documents a stxikhg level of consensus aDong individuals reg{ding the atiributes they considered to be characteistic of various teget groups. Considerable evidence has also been accmulat€d demonstrating the prevalenc€ of ste.eotFic poriraFls of men md $'onen, Afiican Americans, or Asians in rhe mass media and educational mat€ als (se€ Freedman, I9?7; creenberg &Mazingo,1976; McArthur & Resko, 1975; Reid,1979) . Unfortuaiely, this work is nther silenr on ho'r rhe conrent of the media is trdslated into an individual's subjective beliefs, and it often seems to assume rhat 'the m€mbers of the mass media audience simply 'absorb' what is portrayed" (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981, p. 25) . ln addition, becaus€ of the truly social nature of the m€dia those studies that do attempt to unde$tand how media conterts iniuence individual attirudes and betiefs often suffer fiom methodological shoflcomings (e.g., inadequat€ control groups, lack ofcountersrereotypic mcdia examples to serve as stimulus material, conelarional and quasi-experimental designs; see Christenson & Rob€rts, 1983; Roberts & Maccoby, 1985) .
In an effort to better understand fic influence of socially shded beliels o:r *re conrent of a pc.son's stereotypic beliefs, we conducted three srndies rhar document the pot€ntial of such social influeDces for people's stereotypes ofAlrican Americans, a srereo, type that has been ftequendy hporhesized to be based on culturally hansmitted beliefs (e.g., Devine, 1989; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; IGrlins et al., 1969j Seaxs, 1988 . In the studies repoted, a rafid trivial manipulation of feedback about other people's beliefs was capable ofinfluencing participmts' orvn stereoq?ic assumptions and their construal of a member of thc urger group.
A rmjor Foblem for t€sting possible influences of so, cialy shared beliefs oD people's personal stereoqpes deriv€s from the difficulty of providing credible comparison information without ma-king participanrs suspicious about the intention of the manipularion.
Recent findings from survey research may offer an elegant solution to this problem. Work by Sch*dz and his coileagxes demonstrates tlat rhe response scales iD common alticude questionnanes provide mcial information for social comparison (for a revieq see Schwarz & Hippler 1991) . For example, in one srudt thes€ authors varied the labeling ofrcsponse scat€s so rhar for a question asking respondents how much rime they spend watching television daily, half rh€ respondenrj were provided wich an ms'r'er scale that ranged from ef ta '2 hott' to nor" thdn 2't rorB. Dd the rema;nilg respondents were given ^sc^erJit}J up tt 21h htus^trhe low end ar\d. mm than 4t/r rr"rs at the high end {Schwarz, Hippter, Deutsch, &Strack, 1985) . Notonlydid rhe scale manipdation influence r€spondenrs' rcpored hours of TV watcling such that rcspondents reporred higher frequenci€s when provid€d wirh the high-frequency scale but, importandy, th€ response scales also influenced rcspondenLr' subsequent judgments related ro their Tv-watching habits. For exa$ple, respondeDrs rated the importanc€ ofTV for their leisure rime higher when they had beer provid€d wifi the high-fr€quency scale than wh€n given the low-frequency scal€; and r€-sponderts' evaluation of chen satisfacrion with their leisure time was lower when th€y had repored their TV consumption on the high-frequency scale rhan on the low Irequency scale. Of particular interest for rhe currcnt rticle is the findhg rhat respondenrs in ttre highIrequency{cale conditior\ af,so esnm @d th^t the Mage laron spends significmdy more time warching TV rhan did respondents in the lowfrequency{cale condition. Appdendy, respondents use th€ range ofresponse alternatives to infer existing social stDdards-that is, the distribution of possible answers in th€ population. A response in the middle of th€ scale is evid€ndy considered to be the average, or '\rormal,' response in ihe populalion, and responses above or below the scale midpoint are interpreted as a deviation fiom this normality. Thus response scales provide the respondenrwirh implicit information about social standards regarding the issue in question. For our purposes, a similar madpulation seemed lo be wel suited for providing individuals wilh information regarding colrmon beli€fs relared to rhc stereog?e of A6:icaD Americans.
Specifically, we asked participmrs abour their b€liefs regarding ceriain issues related to the common srereot}?e of Alrican Ame cans (e.9., the delinquency rar€ among African Americano while manipulating rhe scales on whi€h participmrs made their responses. To enhrce rhe poknrial impacr ofrhe socialcompaison information Fovided by this mmipulation, we chose to ask participants about issues that r€quired specific factual knowledge-knowledge that parricipmti most likely did not have. This general notion that increaled stimulus ambiguity augments the impact of social compdison infomation has ftequerdy be€n stated in the literatu.€ G€e Allen, 1965; Asch, 1956; Crutchfield, 1955; r'estinger 1954) .' Moreover in a study that specifically manipulated response scale choic€s, Bless, Bohner Hild, and Schl?Iz (1992) observed stronger response scale influenc€s for judgments of increased urcertainty. Accordingly, $,e hlpothesized that in th€ absence of specific tnowiedge for drejudgmert at hand, pa.rticipants would be likely to refer to dre arailable social comparison
In addition, we expected participarts'judgments ro be aff€cted by their actual stereott?ic beliefs. For example, a penon who believ€s that African Ameicans are esp€cially aggressive md violence prone should be likely to giv€ higher estimates for the frequency of c minal offenses mong Africm ADericms than a person who does not believe this.Ir otherwords, pdticipmts stereogpic beliefs about A.frican Ame cms should prcvide a major sour€e of \riance in responses to .he items used in our feedback manipulation. This could, in fact, undermine the etrectiveness ofthe scale manipulation, 1ll,bich is desi$ed to inform participants that the normal responses fall either above or below a p{ticipant's own. The first experiment presented here, dlerefore, intelded to test th€ feasibility of this scale manipulation widr parti€ipants from a poputation thatrvd rclativcly homogeneous jn iL! initial bplie{s abour Afi i' an Amrriran.. Specifically, in Study 1, pdticipmts were fi$t presented (by meais of a scale manipulation) with conparison inforution rega.rding common stereotpic beliefs about AIri€an Ame cms. Subsequently, wc cxamincd the influence of this informa.ion on palticipani-r' own beliefs about this t"rget group, as well as on their beharior torvard a member of the group. Following our a.guments oudined above. l\,e expeLted the compan.on information contained in the response scales .o lead pdticipants to reeuluate fieir ort.rl stereog?ic beliefs. We therefore predicted that participdts would show more negativ€ beliefs about African Americars when presented with negative comparison information tha! wh€n presented with positive information about this t?rget group. We flriher expect€d these differ€nces to influence participalts' subsequentjudgDents of the African Am€rican targ€t.
STUDYl Mzthod
Oua?tezl. Study 1 included two expeimental conditions. Using a manipulation similar to th€ one reported by Schwag et at. (1985) , pdticipants were given feedback regarding certain stereog?ic beliefs that indicated either a more positiv€ or a mo.e negative reality. Con secutively, pdticipanis' raciar beliefs were m€asured, and in D alegedly unrelated bsk, paxticipants were asked to evaluate an frican American defendant in a mockjury trial. In the trial, prrticipmb were pres€nted with evidence that included num€rous references to nega.iv€ contents of the Af:icall American stereotpe, as wetl as individuating information about the defendant. Participmts wcre askcd for rheir verdict and, if the defendant was lound guilty, for an appropdate sentence. FinaIIy, pdticipmts indicated their imFession of the deferdant on a list of 25 trait aqtectives.
Participants. Acommon mea-,ule of beliefs regading Africrn Americans, the Modem Racism Scale (MRS) (Mcconahay, Hrrdee, & Batts, 1981 ) . was administered as part of a larger survey to approximately 1,000 under" graduate udvenity students enrolled in an introductory psychology course. Fifty pdticipmts who classified them-.(hes in rhe queslionnaire a. non{au(a\ian were excludedfiom dle pres€lection sample. The upper 20% of th€ distribution for the Modern Racism Scale was selected as a subsample with relatively homogeneous Iacial beliefs. From this pool of students wifi relatively ncgative beliefs, 35 f€male and male individuals were rmdomly assigned io the curert experiment and parti.ipard in par tial IulfiUmenr of Lheir coube require ments. The data for one paraicipant who expressed suspicior about fie relation berween the two alleg€dly hdependent parts of the study were excluded from the analysis. cbnstrucrian of rspone s.al"s To develop response scales for the experimental manipulation of social comparison informatioD, we aalnidstered the items listed in Table r , combin€d with the MRS, to 84 undergraduate sLudents who participated in rhis pretest on a voluntary basis. All it€ms from Table 1 were presented with an op€n answer format so as not io corvey ary comparison information for what presumably was a "correct" answer. Using only the data from the upper 20% ofth€ distribution for the MRS, we constructed respoDse scales for th€ expe mertal manipulation. For response scales d€-signed 'o (onvey more positive informalion. we constructed scales such that the upper 8070 ofthe responses given by these prerest participants were combined in the highest response altemative. Similarly, the response scales designed to indicate rather negative information were consnucted by combinlrg rie lower 80% ol *re selected pretest respomes in the lowest response alternadve. The overview of items and response scales ir Table 1 conbasts the two experimental conditions. Considering the aryument by Schwarz and his colleagues about the informationat %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% lue of response scales, it becomes apparent that the social comparison information conveyed in the two expe mental conditions was quite ditrerent For example, in Item 8, "Out of 100 btack mates betwean the age of 16 ard 24, how many do you think have spent time in prison?,' the normal response (i.e., dE scal€ midpoinr) in rhe condirion reflecring more positive information was 4.6, whereas in rhe negati\€ information condition ir war 35-39.
Proudun. Parncip^nE were scheduled for rwo consecunve, sepante expe menrs h mix€d€ender goups of three to five. Each participantr?s mndomly assigDed to one of the two experirB€ntal condirions. Parricipanrs were inform€d thar rhe first of the rwo expe ments was part of a national survey r€garding politicar attitudes among studenLs, conducted by the universily's "Center for Political Studies." After giving writt€n consent and being advised that their responses were stricdy anonymous, participanti fi ed out a questionnaire that contained 45 items-the 8 i.€ms for the response scare manipulation, the 7 items of thc MRS, and 30 filler items. The fiIler it€ms included quesrions regarding rac€-unrelated facb, as wel as race-unrelated political auitudes. For dample, participants were asked, "U41at percentage of th€ f€deral budget is spent on the mitirary?" (l6s than 2OVo; 2&247.; 25-2970: 30 3470: J5'/o I ,irl). Anofier questior read 'The governm€nt should take amore active rcle in stimulating dre economy'' Gt'r".94 agreeto stroneb d.iwrez) . Response scales for the fill€r items did not ditrer by condition. The items for the response scale manipularion were placed in the second quarter of the questionnahe md were direcdy followed by $e MRS items. The high number of filler ilems was chosen to conceal rhe race{elated subject of the critical iteDs, md the item placement in th€ qu€stionnaire was intended to ensure participants' attention to the critical ilems. Th€ questionnaire did not ask for any personal intbrmation.
When each person had completed the questionnaire, apprcxiMtely 15 min alter th€ beginning of the study, rhe experiment€r thmked ihe parricipants, explained that theywould receive cr€dit for their participation, md guided rnem back ro the waiting room. Paticipmb werc informed that they would be picked up by another exp€rimenter for the subsequenl, unrelated study. Shody thereafter, a different experimenter, who was blind to the individual participanr\ experimenl2l condition, guided the paiicipalts to another laboratory room ar the other end of the hallway. Here participants w€re informed that they would take part in a study aboutjury decision making. Parti€ipants were told *Iat they would read a summary ofan existing cout trirl and $'ould then be asked individually to decide about a verdicc and possible sentencing. Next, the experimenrer obtained participants' written corsent or a form that differed in wording and q?e style ftom the one used in the Iirst part of the study.
In this 'tecond" dperimen! participants received a booklet with summaries of an allegedly disting court trial. The boollet cortained bdefbackgorDd information about th€ participants in the txial (e.g., age, profession, marital statur) as well as summaries ofthe testimony of four wihesses and the defendant. In the trial, the d€fendanL an Afiican Amedcan l7-year-old, was accused of axmed robbery of a small grocery store.
After th€ trial information, the booklet includcd 'lury inslrucliolrs" that specified the alegations that had to be proven beyond a r€asonable doubt ifthe defendant ere to be foud guilty. Participants' reading time lor the booklet averaged about 20 min. Wher a pdticipant had finished this part of the study, rhe experimerter handed a booklet containing th€ final dependent measues and an envelope to the participanL The participant was asked to answer the questions in .he bool:l€t ard t}len retum the bookl€t to the envelope provid€d. When aII participDr-, had complet€d their tasb the experimenter probed participanl! for surpicion. The exp€riment€r then explained the purpose of the study and d€briefed pdticipmts about th€ deception invotved.In particurar, the expedmert€r presented examples of the scales used in the pr€vioN questionnaire md explained rhe natwe ofthe expe mental manipulatior as well as its pot€ntial effects.
Delaldent,nzas"ns. Fov differert measures w€re obrained. First, participantr' Ecial beliefs as measured by *Ic MRS $,ere assessed direcdy after the expe mental manipulalion. Th€ MRS consisis of seven items ftat are conmonly administered with 5?oint response scal€s ftDgtng ftom stuonqb ag&b stongb disagrce. Fot e ch participant an overal MRs score was calculated by averaging aooss the seven itemq higher scores indicat€ more Degative b€li€fs about Afticm Americans. Th€ remaining dependent mearures were dsessed d paft ofrh€jury decision task. The first measure duing this part of the study as participants' con{idence that the defenda.nt was gui]ry. Specifrcaly, participants w€re asked: "Please, indicate your verdict by checking fie most appropriate alternative." The following response alternatives were FFfoided:1, wry conident, not euilE;2, nod$atzE @nftunL not guilUt 3, not conf.dent, bLt kaning touard not guilty,4 not canfdat, but lzanins tnuard guitEi 5, noderatel, confdat, guilty. 6, loj nnfdnt, guiUt. Participants who chose alternatives 4 through 6 were th€n asked to give an appropriate seniencing suggestior for the def€ndant. The possible sentence could mnge from t month to 60 mondls. Iinally, participants were asked to indicare their personal impression of the defendmt by mting the defendant on a list of 25 traits. Each rating was given on a 7-poinf scale, ranging fro]J. exftene\ k.e., friend,tt) to nol at dlL (tiend.n.'therist included 19 ela.luative traits (e.g., honesr, qmpathetic, sly, violent) and 6 traits with ambiguous e\,?luative connotation, which wer€ added as filler items (e.9., athletic). Each participant's rating on the l9 e luativc txaits were combined to form m averaSp ro'e for fie pardcipant s ta'geL impresjon, ranging from + 3 = most posiriv€, ro 0 = n€utral, to -3 = Ratulh Md Dis%si.m n4iis s.,' r. We hFothesized that the manipulation of the a\.?ilable compadson information should aff€ct participants' beliefs about Aliican Ame cans arrd thus resutr in higher MRS scores for participants in the negative informarion condition than in the positive informarion condii-ion. A comparison of pa{icipants' scores on rhe MRS confirms tlis prediction. participants who were given high response scales for the critical items in rhe questiouaire scor€d significanrly higher on the MRS (M = 3.25) than parricipanrs who rcceived the tow response scales (M = 2.67), (31) = 2.67, ? = .01.'Thar is, beliefs about Aftican Americans, assessed directly after exposure to tle comparisor informarion, were signif! candy mor€ negative wher parricipdrs had been provided with tregative radler than posirive feedback.
IurJ dzcirirn task" We Fedicted rhat rhe differences in participants' racial beliefs would influencejudgmcnb in the mockjury rrial such thar rhose ir the negadve infor_ mation condirion would be more wi ing ro find the Aftican American d€fendant guilty, ro advocare a higher sentence! md io reporr a more negacive imprcssion of the defendant thm would pdricipants in tllc positivc information condition. The data de quice consisrent with these predictions. Parricipants in the negarive information coDditior were sigdficandy more coDfiden. abour the defendant's guilt (M=5 58) thai pdticipaits in dre positive infomation condition (M = 4.12), t(tg) = 2.76,1=.01. Of an participanrs, only rtuee indicated rhar they could not find the defeDdant guilry, alrhough thcy had serious doubts abour his ilnocence. Atl three hdividuals had received low r€sponse scales in rhe pdor scale malipulatiotr. A comparison of rhe suggesrcd senrences for the defendanr r€veals a marked difference berlveen the $vo experimental condirioDs: Parricipants in rhe regative information condition advocated a senrcnce thatw?s, on avemge, 8 months longer rhan in rlle positive infonnation condition (n4s = 26.4? vs. 18.53) . Despire irs size, the difference was not srarisricaUy significanr, t(27) = | .59, p= .12. Yet ir should be kepr in mind thar three of th€ participants in rhe posirive idornarion condition found fie defendant not guittyj narunlly, these participants did not advocar€ any senrence dd therefore did nor enter the analFis. Finaly, fndings ftom the trait ratings r€veal rhat, as h'?othesized, the impresrion of the defendant reporred by pdticipants in th€ positive information condition was significmily less negative (.44=-0.50) thm that repored bypdticipalts in the Degative informarion condition (t4 = -1.04), t(22) =2.68, p= 02.
Thus th€ results provide srrorg evidencc rhar rhe response scal€ infomation affecr€d both parricipmr_rr general beliefs about th€ targ€r group and rheir emluation ofa specific group membex At rhe same rime, rhese data raise the question of how rhe scale maniputation might affect respondenl, who do nor hold such ncgarive views about the rarg€i group inirialy as the pa, ucrpdrB sel€cted for the curent experim€nl
In fact, there is r€ason ro suspect thar individuals wi*r relatively positive mcial beliefs may be less influenced by th€ social comparison informariotr provided in th€ current manipularion. Evidence from research on Iacial auitudes suggestr thar low?rejudiced individuats may assume fie general public to be more prejudiced rhan thmselves whereas high-prejudic€d individuals may view the average person's racia.l auirudes as mrher simitar to their own (O'corman, 1975) . r so, then the social coDparison informarion provided by the rcsponse scates should have less relevm€e for pafticipants scoring tow on the MRS, becau-se these individuals should inrerprer the information as reflecring rh€ betiefs of dissimila others (Festingcr, 1954) or others who are nor considered members of rtre salienr in€roup Gllner 1991 ) . To test this hFothesis, a s€cond experiment compared the response scale effecr! for two groups of participanrs who diffcred substantially in their iniriat b€liefs abourAfiicm STUDYI Participanh. Se\enryane undergraduate university students enrolled in m introductory psychology couse participated in rhe experimenc in partiat tumlment of their counc requiremenLr. As in Srudy 1, a targer sample (approximately 1,500 sruderts) had been preresred on the MRS. For the €urrenr study, pariciparts were ran_ dom\' selectcd ftom the subset of respond€nrs who identified themselves as Caucasian and who held eirher relatively positive racizl beliefs (scoring in the lo,yer 20% of the MIIS distdburion) or r€lativety negative ncial beliefs (upper 20%).
Praeduft nd mtufial:. The experiment took ptace in m identicat fashion ro Srudy l, excepr that rhe scales uscd to manipulare .he social comparison information werc redesi$ed. In the firsr srudt rhese scales had been consructed on the basis ofpreiest data from onty those respondenls$'ho scoredhighon rhe MRS;scales for rhe currcnt snrdy were based on the entire pretest distribution. Becausc, in the prer€sr, individuals wirh tower MI{S scores tended to respond wich more posirive estimares, this redcsign led, in effect, to more positiv€ feedback in the positive response scale condition. For example, *re rcsponse scale used in the posirive information cordition lbr Item 5 ("Out of 100 black srudents ar '.our university, how many gained access primarity because of afErmative action policies?") €hanged from 1,$ rran l, 5-14, 15 24, 25-J4, 35 ot n6ei\ Srudy I to less than 1, t-j, 4-6-7 q. l0 t' nor.in the curenr experimenr.
Manipulirtkn .i".;. In addirion to the €xperiment propea we conducted a pretesr to asce ain wherher rhis somewhat more exrreme sc?l€ manipulation did ind€ed lead to differerrial inferences regading other people's beliefs on th€ issues in question ?nd n'he$er fte manipulation was €qually etrective for the two distinct participant groups. An independent sample of 117 individuals pdticipat€d in this prctest, fllling out a questionnaire that, besides sev€ral filler items, consisted of the MRS, follo\,red by two maDiPulacion items selected ftom the qu€stionnaire to be used ir the actual expedment (Item 3, on high shool graduation rares, and Item 8, on delinquency rates). The mDipulation items ap' peared with eith€r the positive or the negative resPonse scale md were succeeded by an exPlicit question regarding participants' perceptions of existing social srandards For example, after Item 3, participants received the query: "Asked about how mary blacks be$'een L\e ages of20 to 40 hav€ a high school degree, rvhat do you think the average student at your Uni\€rsity ould eslimate?" An open respoNe format uas used for fiese social stmdard questions to maintain identical formats in thc hto €xperimental feedback condirions.
The responses to the two social standard questions of tlose participants who scored in eirher the loner or lhe upper 20% of the MRs distribution $'cre submi.t€d to two separat€ 2 (positive vs. negative sc?le information) by 2 (low vs. high premmipulation MRS score) analyses of vadance (ANOVAS). These amlyres .evealed only highly significant main effects for the scale manipulation: Item 3,F(1,54) = 70.58, I < .000r; Irem 8,-F(1,52) = 41.71, ! < .0001. ParticipanB who rcceived positive respons€ sc?res p€rceived the social standards for answe$ to the high school graduation md dclinquency ntes as more positive than pdticiPmts given the negative rcspons€ scales (8Tadtznon I4s= 74.26Va \s.46.04% delinqu€ncy Ms = 13.5170 vs. 3r.61%). Importandy, thes€ €ff€cts were not qualifi€d by ttYo{vay interactions (Fs < l), indicating that high-and low-MRS participantr made similar inf€rences regarding the beliefs held by the average member of a comParison group. The Prccest rhus confirmed that both participant groups (high and lo!r' MRS) used the response scales to make inferences regarding dominant beliefs in a relerant comParison group (students at th€ir universiry).
Restllrs and. Dis c11-,sim
As can be seen ir Table 2 , Study 2 rcplicated in large part the result! ftom the Fevious experiment. Participants who received positive response scale info.mation again scored lower on the MRS md overali sboved a more positive e\aluatiotr of the African Ameri.2. defen_ dant. Ar hpothesized, this was txue o y for particiPdts with high MRS pretest scores. The scale maniPulation did not aff€ct low-MRS participants' responses to the d€pendent mealur€s.
Separate 2 (positive vs. negative scare hformation) by 2 (low \ts. hiBh pr€manipulation MRS score) ANovAs Looking at the results for the two ParticiPant grouPs separately, simple eflect anaryses confirm rhat the m€an differences obtained for high-MRS particiPants postmanipulation MRS score and their guilt mtings were reliable, MRS.F(1,34) =8.20, P=.007; guilt.F(1,34) = 12.93, I = .001 . Similar mean differences observed for the other h{o dependent measures, sentencing and targ€t impr€s-sion, remained too small to reach statisticar siSnificance, Fs < 2. Thus th€se results replicate the findings from th€ previous experimeni; however, the manipulation had a smaller overall effect on high-MRS participants' elaluation of th€ Atrican Americar target in thejuy decision In contrast to these results for high-MRS Participants, *re scale manipulation showed no effecr on low-MRs participanb' responses to the dep€nd€nt measures Although tlle observed m€ans reflect a slight contrast effectfor low-MRS participants, in that negarive resPonse scale information yielded slighdy more posirive measues of racial b€liefs ard t rg€r evaluarion, &ese differenc€s proved to be highlt unreliabl€, allq < 1d
The analyses also rev€aled an additioDal set of main etrects for participarts' MRS scor€, indicating thar, independenr of the scate manipulation, high-MRS parricipants tended to €valuate the African American defendant more negatively, guilt, F(1, 70) =73.62,!< .0001; sentence, F(1,70J = 7 55, y' = .008, and, nor surprisingly, scored higher on rhe postrnnipularion MRS, F(r,70) = 178.24, y'<.0001.
In summary, the data support our €onjecture rhar lorFMRS participants would remain uninfluen ced by &e scale manipulation. Moreover, the result5 for high-MRS paxticipants geneEly replicate the findings from Srudy l. demonsfaling rhe influen,e ot socidl compdison information on high-MRS participants' beliefs abour the target group and th€ir e%luation of a specific member of this group.
Although the pres€ni fmdings are consisienr with our interpretation that the observed effect-, resuh from rhe differential feedback abo"t othil ?tu?tz\ beliefs, an ^lLer-native hterpretation could be rhat rhe scates insread provided participants witl] lactual infolmatian on rhe questions at hand. In other lords, parricipants may have ialen the scales as indicators of fte correct statistical facts (perhaps assuming the researcher had experrise on th€ issue in question) mther thm as renecting the distri, bution of respoDses among a relcvanr comparisoD group.'From this perspective, our madpularion check, which demoNtrated thar participants did infer social standadi from rhe scale information, would be unde.-stood as a post hoc respoNe that participmts cme to only after first infering something abour the srate of some objective reality-not as a true indicator rhat rhe scales served as social comparison infomarion, as we proPose.
To pursue this possibility turriea r|'€ analzed parricipanb' personal beliefs on the critical issues as indicared b) their responres lo the manipularion irems in Srud) 2. For this analysis we cod€d participants' responses on t]re 5-point scales as t-5, \a'here higher numbe$ indicare more negative r€sponses, and computed an overall score for each participant by avdaging acro$ the eight manipulation items. Becaus€ the expedmenral manipulation vaded the response labels for rhese items, comparisons between conditions are nor inrcrpretable. Accordingly, we ana\zed participmi-r' response scores separately by maaipulatior conditior as a tuncrion of their pr€maniputation MRS scores. In the posilive feedback condition, both high-and low-MRS paf,ticipants' average responses for the manipulation irems fell slightly above the scale midpoint (high-MRS ,14= 3.39; low-MRS M= 3.26) . The difference between fte means for tlle tl|,o Wittenbrink, Henly / CREAING SOCIAL REALITY 605 participant goups was u eliable,I < 1.In the negarive feedback condition, however, high-and low-MRS parr_ici-pants responses ditrer€d retiably. Whereas high-MRS partrcipants again responded clos€ to the scale midpoint, low-MRS participanl, gave, on average, significantly more positive answers (high-MRS M = 2.61; low-MRSM= 1.83),,F(r, 36) = 18.47,1=.0001. Thus low-MRS participants showed significandy tess agreement wirh th€ informarion contained in the negarive feedback condition than high-MRS participants, atthough high-and low-MRS participmrs inferred simild social standdds in the mmipulation check reported carlier. II participanrs had based rheirjudemenb sot€ty on thetu perceptions of an objective r€aliry, we would have expecred ftat the difierences high-and low-MRS pa.ticipanrt show in regard to whar they believe ro be the correct item responses would also appear on tbeh responses to the social standard items, yet no reliable differetrceswere evident in the manipulation check (Fs < 1)." Thus th€se findings are at odds wirh th€ altemative explanntion of our result! positing that rhe scale manipulation provided solely factual informarion, which was then used for inferences regarding socirl siandards. Our original inrerpretation, however-that the scale information led participanrs .o infer other peopte's beliefs and thar low-MRS participanrs disregarded .his information when they considered it ro be prejudiced-remains quite consistenr with the results. Neverileless, we decided to conduct ar additional €x-pedment that would provide D even sronger rest ofour h}?othesis by gready limiting the possibiury that fte experimental procedure conveyed factuat information about the issues of inter€st.
STUDY3
Partici?anx. Participar]ts were again r€cruited ftom the upper and lower 20% of rlle distribution for rle MRS, which had been administered as part of a larger su ey to approximately 800 undergraduate univenity srudenrs enroled in an inboducrory psychology cours€. From this pool of studenrs, :[4 individuats parricipated in the experimenr in pdlialfirfrlmenr ofrheir courqe requirePrccedur€ o,nd, tMteiab. Participants wer€ asked ro fill out a questionnaire oste$ibly designed to invesrigare how accurately peopl€ perceived tlle generat pubiic's beliefs on \,rious political issues. The irems on rhis questionnaire were larg€ly identical to those used in lhe previous expe ment. As in Studies I and 2, a ser of maniputation items, followed by rhe Modern Ra" cism Scale, was embedd€d in a larger number of fiIer qu€stions. Howevea we charged the questionnaire in .he following ways.
L lnsread ofdsking pa' dcipants abou' fieirown opin ions otr a given issue, the m4iority of the questionnaire items were concerned with participants' percepiions of ofier people's beliefs. Specifically, all manipulation iiems used ftom th€ previous questionnaire were trmsformed into explicit statements for which pa icipants had to indicate how preElent they thought ihose bcliefs to be in the genem.l public. Ior example, Item 3 flom the positive social standard condition ofstudy I norv read: "lvhat percent of th€ general public do you think agrees with the folowing statemenc 'About 85% ofBl'.ks bd iween $e ages of 2M0 have a high .chool d.gree. -2. A manipulation dilTerent from the one used in thc previous €xperiments varied the content ol tne stereoq?ic beliefs presumably shared by others. Ratler than manipulating the information contained in the response scales, the expe ment instead varied the content of the stereogpic beliefs reflected in the questior itser. For e&mple, Item 3 asked paticiparts in tne positive standard condition to estimate the percentage ofthe gereral publi€ who agreed with the premise Gat 85% or Bhcks in a given ag€ group had rec€iv€d a high school degree. In th€ regative stnrdard condition, this question asked participants to estimate the percentage of the general public who agreed that 50% of Btacks held high school d€grees. For each condition,lh€se statements$'ere consiructed by using the midpoint of thc response scales from Lhe corresponding condition of Lhe previou' ex-3. The r€sponse scales for these questio)rs varied morg items and were desigred such dlat dlc scale midpoint for thes€ manipulation items was a1r'ays at least 60%, wi*r all response altematives referring to a reference point of 5070 or higher (e.g., 5a% ar Ie$; 557.; 607o; 65Vo; 70Vo o/ ,rrlr). Ionowilg rhe rarionale of fered by Schwarz and his colleagues, thcsc scales should have ted parricipants, independent of conditior, b nfer that the large majoriry of *re g€n€ral public agreed widl the slat€ment pr€sented in the question. Impofiandy, the resedcher's expertise potentially reflected in dlese response s.ales concerncd only his or h€r knowledge about social standards present among the general public, mther than knowledge about factual issues contain.d in t}Ie beliefs ftemselves.
4. Whereas the previous expe ments used'\iudents at your university" as the potential reference grorp, the curent questionnaire refered to the genelal public as a whol€. Items I (which referred ro a particular slate's wefare budget) md 5 (which asked for Blacks access to a particular univ€rsity) therefore had to be reworded so that they applied to beliefs of a more general audience. question 6 (campus rallies) was drcpped from the list of manipulation items becaus€ it was an issue specific io college populations. This l€ft seven manipulation items, which were folowed for a participants by fte seven itcms from the MRS.
5. Finally, the set of fillers wzl adapted so that it inctuded questions similar in format to th€ manipulation it€ms as well d questions that dked participanb about their personal opinion on \ariour issues (compaEble to the MRS ilems) . Th€ response scal€s us€d for filler items asking about other people's beliefs varied substantially, so as to increase the alleg€d diagnosticity of dre response scales for participanLr' inf€rences regarding the prevalenc€ of rhe beliefs in question.
once all participants had completed their questionnaires, the sperimenter explain€d the actual pupose oflhe study. As part ofdris deb efing, the erperiment€r read aloud *re maripdation items and explain€d how both the questior wording and the response scales had been designed to influence the respondents' infer€nces.
Re\ulx and. Dis%sion
If lndeed the findings obtained in the previous two eipe mcnts are attributable to participanLr' a-,sump tions about social standards conveyed by the response scales, tlren this altemative questioma;re manipulation should yield similar results. Results from Study 3 indicate that this is in fact the case. This more stringent iest of ou. hpodesis obtains resnlts for participants posimanipulntian MRS scores that are almost identical to those observed in the previous expcriment (see Tabl€ 3). A 2 (positive vs. negativ€ questionnaire information) by 2 (tow vs. high premdipulation MRS score) ANovA revealed significant main effects for both factorsquesdonnaire information, F(1,43) = 5.44, P= .025; MRS score, F(1, 43) = 140.83, 1< .0001, and a significant nro-\'?) int r don. / ( l. 43\ -4.41. P -. .042
The obtain ed main effect for prticipants' MRS score simply confirms that high-MRS paraicipmts again scored Iligher on the posemanipulation test than lowMRs parricipants. Of considenbly more interest is the fact that, as in tlle Fevious expedm€nts, exposure to posrtive ster€o-q'pic standdds led, on average, to lo$,€r scores on the posrrnanipulation MRS. Again, this €ffect was confined to participants lvho initially held relatively negative racial beliefs. High-MRS parricipants who received posi. tive scereog?ic standards scored lower on the postman ipulation MRS thm participants who received negative nformation, whereas the questionnane mmipulation had virtualy no eITect on low-MRS participants' responses to the MRS items. Additioral separate ana\,ses for the two participant groups con{irm that only the mean differences obrain€d for high-MRS participadts' In summary, the results replicate the previous findings, demonsirating the influence of the Fovided questiornaire information on high-MRS participants' stereotypic b€liefs about the target group. Importmdy, this replication was obtained with a mmipularion rhat provided paticipants more directly with information rcgtul:ng z socia J shared,reality, nfher than with a realiq' potentially defined by an expert (i.e., social scientists). As such, the results underscore our previous conclusion that the observed efiects are attributable to participan t5' assumptions about social standards as conveyed by the questionnaire. Overcll, these r€sults lend saong support to our contention tiar parricipmb' st€reoq?ic beliefs de sensitive to feedback about a socirlty defined reariq' when this reality is deemed rele\,znt for their personal beliefs.
CENER.{L DISCUSS1ON
To investigate the influ€nce of a socially construcred rearity on people's stereoq.?ic beliefs and their bchavior toward a stereotyped target, participant, received differential leedback regardingsuch a reaLiry In firee e\peri-ments, parliciparts were exposed to informarion designed to Fovide feedback regarding other peoplc's s.er€oqpic beliefs abour Afiican Americans by means oI a mmipulated questionnaire ostensibly measufi)g political opinions. In support ofour hporheses, rhe differ€ntial feedback coNistently influenced participmts' beliefs abour AJrican AJDFricms acrors rhe expF, LT.nrs. When the information suggested tharotherpeople held reladvely neSdtiw beliefs abour Alrican,aureri, an,. pdticipants subsequerdy expressed more negative beliefs about the target group themselves. Furthermore, in the inilial two sludies, the etrecr ol Lhe s, ale inlormarion al,o canied over to participarts' actual behavior toward a specific Aliican American target in an unrclated contex! drejury d€cision task. In this alegedly independent part of th€ erperimental procedur€, participants in rhe n€gative information condition tended toperceive rhe African tunedcan deferdant more negatively th,I pariicipants in the positive informatior condition. wltereas WittenbdnK, Henly,/ CREATING SOCIAL RE"ALITY 607 this transfer to a sp€cmc bxger *?s observed reliably for participants' evaluation of the defendani's guili, it proved to be l€ss stable for th€ other two dependenr mcasures enployed, sentencing and rrnit impressions.
Importandy, results from Srudies 2 and 3 indicate rhai the influence of the questionnaire informarion was qualifled by pdticipants' inirial beliefs abour the r?rget group. Participmts with relaiively positive beliefs about Afiicm Am€ricans, scoring low on the MRS, showed no ditrerences in then responses to any of rhe postmanipuIhe subjuttue Meaning of the Qu?:tionndire Man;pulatinns The present etrectswere obtained using experimental manipulations thal were based on an obser\,?tion by Schwarz and his colteagues according to which suvey respondentsuse response scales for inferences aboutrhe issues in question. As mentioDed, our manipulations in the initinl 6vo sperim€nts differed slighdy from those employed in the Schwrz et al. (1985) studies. In rhe work by Schwarz and his colleagues, the actual/a., abour which the r€searcher presumably held exper knowledge was identical with nae social standards th^r were to be infelled (i.e., the ftequency of certain behaviors among the general public). In the present situation, however, oqe.ttue rcaliq was not necessarily rh€ same as roaaJ realily (i.e., the socialty dominant beliefs). The fa€t rhat a giv€n belief about African Americans is objectively true (e.9., because the resedcher klows of rele\,ant statistics on the issu€) does not imply that this "hu*r" is shared by the general public.
Yet the data lrom Studies I md 2 suggest tbar participants nevetheless used these respons€ scales for inferen, e' regarding ot'her people s beliets. More impor rd r. in the case of low-MRS participmrs who w€re giv€n negative scale information, social stardards were in, ferrcd ftom dre scales even though these participants apparendy r€jected .h€ \didiry of the factual info.mation contained in rhe scales. In Study 3, moreover, a mmipulation that provided explicir informarion about the rcscarcher's assumptions regarding existing social standads, mther thrn his or her knowledge of factual issues, lelded identical results. In light of rhese dara, it appcars as if prticipants not so much droughi rhat rhe response scales reflected the researcher's expert knowledgc about m issue but instead assrmred rhat the surv€y's authors made use of respons€ scales that they deemed appropriate for capturing the exp€cted distribution of an$\'crs. Such a 'pragmatic scale design " heudsric wonld be consistent with the findings reported by Schwav e t al. ( 1985) , but it would also clearly caprure our own participants' behavior more adequately dran does th€ alternative 'tcales represenr facts" heuristic. It seems necessary for futu.e research to turther address this issue of what underlying assumptions respondenL, make in their use of su.vey response scales.
In the present experiments, social comparison information affected participmts' beliefs regardirg African Amencms as assess€d by ihe MRs, a measure Gat has been proven to adequately capture people's beliefs about this particular target group and has bee. shom to predict behavior ard social judgments rel,red to Africm Americans (for a r€view, see Mcconahay, 1986) . Similuly, in Studies 1 and 2, the postmanipularion diferences ir pdticipants' MRS scores also trDsferred to tneir evalualion of a spe€ific gloup target. In addition to these effects on participanb' beliefs rcgarding African Americans, it is quite likely that the scale manipularion may have irfluenced other b€liefs related to the issues nised in th€ critical items. After all, the items provided feedback not orly about dre realily of African Ame cans but also aboul, for example, wetfrre policies in general. As others have dgued, stereoq?ic knowledge exists within a context of, and is inticately related b, other beliefs about fie orld. Stereott?es have been thought to depend on people's knowledge of the hisrory of group inreractions (see Shedt 1967), on their political ideologies (see Feather,1984; Penigrew & Mee.tens, 1995) , and on their values (see lktz & Hass, I988; Rokeach, 1968) . That is, information about issues drat arc related to a person's stereoqPic knowledgc of a given sociat group are likeb, to also afect the person's stereoq?ic construal of this group itself. In fact, as the exmple of the '$eifare queen emplo)ed in lne 1984 U.5. P,e'idcntial campajgn sug gesred, one particularly effeclive stategy for agen6 of social illnuence (e.9., &e media, politiciant to adoptis the communication of information about "abstract" political issues wher indeed targeting people's stereoq?ic beliefs about a specific social group (Edsall & trdsal,1991) .
Thc Vaudafine Fun.tion of Sociat In|h.Enft Throughout this sticle, we have emphasized the iDformational value of the compadson information lbr participmts' stercog?ic beliefs. That is, our questionnaire manipulations provided participantr with feedback about the content of other people's beliefs. Although ille present data do notaddress this question, it seems likely that such feedback would also affect respondents' inferences about what de considered to be socialy accept€d beliefs. It is therefore plausible that the etrects observed lor high-MRS participant! reflect to some degr€e their assumplions about how acceptable it was to express negative beliefs aboutAfricm Ameri.ans. Nevertheless, fier€ are several reasons to conclude thar l}le present r€sults docuDert effects that lead beyond the mere manipulation of belief exprcssion. First, Ne took several precautioN co make it easier for parlicipants to dissenrftom rhe puryorted standards (e.9., arlegedly no identifying information was collccted with the ques' tiomaire responses; in Studies 1 md 2, the conncction between tne questionnaire and the ':jury tdal" wa not dislosed ro pafl i( ipantsr. SeLond, whe'eas r he.omparison information provided f€edback about specific issues, rhe eflects of this feedbackwere observed on much more general belicfs aboul the target group, in participmts' responses to rhe MRS. As Studies I and 2 demonstrate, the experimental manipulation also aff€cted th€ evaluation of a specific targe! presented in a quite diffcrent social €ontexr md measured approximately 30 min apart from the scale manipulatio:r. Although we would be hesitdt to dlaw any conclusions about thc long-term significance of these effects, the Iinding does stand in contrast to the coercive effects of social influence thac are taditionally associatedwi*r more spccific and shorlterm compliance (see Asch, 1956i Nemeth, 1986 Rohrer, Blaron, Hoffman, & Swander, 1954; Sheril 1935) . Moreover m interFetation of the presenr resuits as solely reflecling effects on pdticipmts' bclief,41610l, is difficult to maintain in the face ol our findings for low-MRS participaDtr. Why were these pdticipanls iess affected drar rhe high-MRS participan.s by rhe feedback manipulation, if indeed they were faced with similar rormative pressures to conform? Although rhere is evidence that individuals who subscribe to positive beliefs regarding Af.ican Americans tend to view ther owr opinions as dissimila from chose held by the avengc person\ (o'Corman, 1975) , we know of no findings suggesting rhat these lowTrejudiced individuals are less affected by normative Plessues. A perhaps more important role of rormative aspectt ofsocial influence for the presentfindings is their rele-\,"nce for dre Elidation of beliefs based on availablc social comparison information. As others have pointed ou! existing social norms and the individual's aspimtions to comply with these norms arc important faciors in the acceptance of other peopte's views (Moscovici, 1976; Tunea 19S1) . Thatis, true influence, the conversion of beliefs, requires that available comparison information be considercd valid in the first place. Whether a Biven piece of information is considered lalid is in large part determined by social rules and convenhons; and acceptance of these conventions is a necessary precondition for the effecriveness of informationat influen.e. Recendy, Oakes. Haslam. ad Turner 11994) reemphasized this very poinl by arguing that ttereotpes are soci?l norms," defnitions of realily by social consensus (p. 209). As such, socially shared stereott?es off€r standards for potential memings of the {orld Quit€ consistent with this view, we have interyreted our results for low-MRS participants as an indicarion of their disregard for societal standards-standards thar this pdticipant group mighr perceive as a reflecrion of widespr€ad pr€judice in U.S. sociery. Resulrr from Study 2 indicate that high-and low-MRS parricipanls used the response scales to infer other peoplet beliefs, bur bottr the depend€nt measures and parriciparts' respo$es rc the manipulation irems rhemselves indicare that rhese standards had limired ef€ct for low-MRS participmrs' beliefs.
Work in the Eadition of social idendq, rheory may provide an inter€sting verue for furrher research ro bett€r underst nd these findings. This work suggesrs that the acceptance of social norms should be mediared in important wa's by participaLr' salient in€roup membenhip (Turner r99l) . That is, various studies havc demonstrated rhat sali€nr group membe$hip in the comparison group renders comparison informatiol) more influential (se€ Hogg & Tuner 1987; Mackie, 1986) . Future research co ldmanipulate the salience of the refer€nce comparison group to resr whetler ir is nl fact the dis.egard of social standards that prcvenb the response scale information fi:om afieccing tow-MRS pdOur findings have implicarions for rhe bronder issue of stereoq"ing and prejudice as they operare ourside lhe laboEtory. Whereas our scale Ddipr ation $,as a subr_le me?ns of cotrveying social comparison informarion, society provides people wirh much srronger and more splicit social fe€dback-feedback abour both srereoq?ic group attributes and dle undertying causes ofttese attributes. Indeed, as mentioned ar the ourset of n\is article, researchers have accumulared ample evide cc for the pr€lzlence of social srereorpcs in the mass media. In th€ face ofsuch stereory?erongruent social "rearity," it is ro wonder rhar srereorpes prove ro be quite rigid. Yet, more optimisricallt social influcnce nor only may reinforce the status quo but cm tead ro chmge as wel. Therefore, in|ervenrion< ar r .ocieLrt t.vpl (i.F., targeting the media, school cuniculums, and other broader socializing agerrs) may be pdticularly powerful facbrs in stereoq?e chmge and dle alleviation ofprejudice. NOTES r. Moscolici (1985) hd loincd our ihar rhe efects of siimulu Mbiguitt on peoplet hotimlion io seek oul compuison with orhers e themselves dependent on a scial consrldi;n of rhe stimxlu situatjo!, Ont when so.ial convenlions sugges rhar ftere de %lid, .orect antreB ro a problem does it make sense to .efe. to otLer peoplet belie& on this issue-2. II I lsels reporred in rhis a.ricte de twerailed. -Notr Lhd r qmrlar di,onlDon beMper exprn krortFd8e dd $.;l sLndid5 rFnF Fd in rhe re+or* *ah" d;s nor apply @ rhe \{ort by s.hw er at. 0985) . h these studi€s, rh€ resedch;; s experrhe ron, crn. hi, or hfl rnoslcdS" of $e nFquen.voi c,an beir.v roF rhr F.pond.na G atcd I o repon . Thu rhe expfl I knostrdge provldes informarion about ensting ecial shddds. 4. A compdson including only ibe tm nanipulation irems ftom the nanipulation .ne.k (ksms 3 and 8) yields idendcal resnlts. In rhe negative feedbac( condition,lor MRSsubjects again gave, Dn 3r'i 68e, mor. polirilr rcsponk. Lhan hrgh MRS subje(rs: high ".hool Braduduon. /. L 36, -2,21.,..oOt:drlinqurnc,rarcs. a(1,36) = 10,92, t=.00?.
